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GOSSIP, THE OFFICE AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
by
Jerome O'Callaghan, * Rosemary Hartigan,** and
Paula O'Callaghan ***

"If you want to be absolutely literal, all human life is speech. Every time a
person goes to work all he does is speak. Or write. Or listen to other
people speaking. Or eat lunch."
- Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer'
" ... gossip is a valuable aspect of free speech."
- C. Edwin Baker2

INTRODUCTION
In 2007 four employees of the town of Hooksett, New
Hampshire, were fired for gossiping about a suspected
romantic liaison between their boss, the Town Administrator,
and a recently promoted town employee. The dismissed
employees, all female, became known as the Hooksett Four. 3

The Hooksett Four sued the town and identified themselves
publicly, giving numerous interviews in local and national
4
media. The Town of Hooksett responded by issuing a public
'Associate Dean, Arts and Sciences, Associate Professor of Political Science, State
University ofNew York at Cortland.
" P rofessor and Director, Business and Executive Programs, Graduate School of
Management and Technology, University of Maryland University College.
" ' Assistant Professor, Business and Executive Programs, Graduate School of
Management and Technology, University of Maryland University College.
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statement explaining and defending the town's actions in firing
the four, 5 and subsequently settled with the two plaintiffs who
had filed suit in federal court. 6
Although the cases associated with the Hooksett Four did
not make it to trial, they raise interesting questions about the
status of gossip as a category of protected speech under the
First Amendment in the context of public employment. Private
employers are generally immune from liability for abridging
the free speech of employees, but the obligations/risks of a
government employer are less clear. This review serves to
illustrate the limitations of Supreme Court free speech doctrine
as applied to this deceptively important category of speech.
WHAT IS GOSSIP?
A review of social science and management literature and
numerous court cases indicates that there is much variation in
the definition of "gossip." However, paraphrasing Justice
Stewart Potter's famous comment -- about another much
maligned and discredited form of communication, -pornography -- despite the difficulty of defining it, most of us
know it when we see or hear it;7 or, at least, we think we do.
Hearsay, rumor, and gossip are related concepts. Often in
common usage, the three terms are equated. All involve
communication of derivative information (to a second party or
parties) originally obtained from a third party. Segregating
rumor from gossip involves very fine distinctions, for example:
"Rumor's foundation is lack of evidence -- without regard for
topic; gossip specifies the topic -- the moral doings of humans - but ignores its factuality. "8 While gossip usually involves an
arguably inappropriate disclosure of information, the
inforn1ation it conveys may be factual. 9

3Nol25/North East Journal of Legal Studies

The subject of this paper is, specifically, workplace gossip,
which Kurland and Pelled define as "informal and evaluative
talk in an organization, usually among no more than a few
individuals, about another member of the organization who is
not present." 10 They note that The American Management
Association distinguished "the grapevine" from gossip,
asserting that the former may involve a wide range of topics,
11
but gossip is focused on information about people.
For more than 100 years courts have taken notice of
"gossip" in their opinions, but mostly in a dismissive manner,
frequently using the phrase "mere gossip" in reference to
hearsay statements that are not admissible for evidentiary
purposes. 12 In the cases we examined where gossip (or
was central in an employment action, most of the courts dtd not
attempt to define gossip. Rather, they examined the operative
definitions of prohibited behavior specified in the employers'
written policies. 13 In a few cases, the courts relied on the same
In Dillon v. Twin Peaks Charter
dictionary definition.
14
Academy, the court found it necessary to define "gossip" in
an employment action suit where the academy's code of
conduct prohibited "malicious gossip and similar activities" but
gave no definition in the code. The judge in Dillon,
several dictionaries, provided this definition: "Gosstp" IS
defined consistently... as "idle talk" or "rumor," "especially
about the affairs of others." 15 The Court in Fitzgerald v.
Stanley Roberts, Inc. 16 relied on this same definition in a case
involving the admissibility of gossip (as hearsay).
In this paper we limit our discussion of gossip to talk (which
includes all forms of communication) about the affairs of
individuals. We will not apply the dictionary definition,
because the term "idle" makes general, commonly held,
assumptions about the purpose and intent of gossip that are not
always supported in fact. Rather, we will apply Kurland and
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Pelled's value-neutral definition: "informal and evaluative talk
in an organization, usually among no more than a few
individuals, about another member of the organization who is
not present." 17

GOSSIP IN THE OFFICE - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Formal and informal communication networks exist in all
organizations. Formal communication networks are created to
manage the content, flow and frequency of information
Methods of formal
throughout the organization. 18
communication
may
include
meetings,
newsletters,
employee handbooks, and official company policies. Existing
in parallel to, and supplementing the formal communication
network, informal communication networks, commonly
referred to as "the grapevine," spring up in all organizations.
These informal networks are neither planned nor sanctioned by
management, and depending on circumstances, may support or
conflict with the employers' formal networks. 19 Gossip is
widely recognized as a pillar of informal communication
networks in organizations, but it has received surprisingly scant
attention in management or organizationalliterature. 20
Employers often view gossip as eroding employee cohesion
and discipline, stealing time, and creating a work environment
replete with unreliable information, innuendo, backstabbing
and distrust.
Commentators 21 have noted that "popular"'
business literature tends to promote an overly simplistic and
negative view of gossip, ignoring its potential benefits in
organizations. 22
The literature we examined presents a more balanced view,
recognizing the positive and negative potential of gossip in
organizations. Several authors noted that gossip serves a
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valuable role in sustaining community/organizational norms,
adequately
values, and morals, which are not always
Often sm_all
through formal communication avenues.
groups are more effective at regulating this tyPe of behaviOr
before it comes to the attention of the formal hterarchy and has
.
.
24
a larger impact on the orgamzatiOn.
In a study of four organizations, Hafen contends that gossip
may promote positive "organizational citizenship
that benefit the organization or "workplace devtance
25
behaviors" that undermine organizational efforts.
Gossip can
have positive effects on an organization
rules, values, morals, and organization tradttton and htstory,
thus facilitating group cohesion.
Hafen discusses how
management can benefit from some gossip, i.e., it_
be
transformed into useful information for orgamzattonal
regulation when it is relayed to someone in authority in the
organization. In this vein gossip about company "heroes" and
26
"anti-heroes" serves as a "kind of social control." Of course,
gossip is also used in organizations to resist
authority. Hafen found that gossip is used to restst regulatt?n,
"debunking implicitly the organizational creed of placmg
. .
h
1 "
u27
efficiency and pro ductlvtty over uman re a t tons.

GOSSIP IN THE OFFICE - LEGAL ISSUES
An employee discharged on the basis of
or
spreading gossip may be incredulous
s_uch ubtqmtous
behavior can be legal grounds for termmatiOn.
As one
reviewer put it "[G]ossip ... appears to be a normal and
'
h
.
,28
necessary part of life for all but the rare ermtt among us.
One study estimated that as much as 80% of human
29
communication could be classified as gossip.

20 11/Gossip/6

Although there are not many judicial opinions concerning
employees who have been terminated purely on the basis of
office gossip, gossip has been cited as one of the grounds for
termination in at least ten fully litigated cases in the United
. the past twelve years. 30 These are cases where
S tates m
published opinions are available. No doubt there are many
more instances, such as the Hooksett Four cases, where the
1
parties settle before triae and incidents where terminated
employees do not sue at all. 32 Of course, gossip also can be a
form of informal resistance for employees in lieu of, or prior
to, pursuing formal grievance or legal redress.
There are several legal approaches available to fired-forgossip plaintiffs to challenge their termination including the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine
under the common law, the employment discrimination statutes
or hostile work environment theories, and the abridgement of
free speech constitutional guarantees. With the common law
and statutory theories having been explored in a prior paper,33
the focus of this paper will be constitutional theories based on
free speech.

The First Amendment Issue
While private employers are generally immune from
liability for abridging the free speech of employees, that
immunity does not necessarily extend to the governmental
employer. A government employee retains the option of
invoking the First Amendment, to allege that government has
punished speech protected by the Constitution.
ln the routine discussion of speech protected by the First
Amendment, gossip is a category that receives scant attention.
heavy hitters in this area generate significant case law, law
revtew comment, complex theories and ever-expanding hard-
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cover casebooks. These are the categories that test the
boundaries; they include defamation, sedition, obscenity,
religious speech and commercial speech. Assuming one is not
an absolutist, the business of understanding the free speech
guarantee is the business of drawing boundaries around the
concept of free speech.
Van Alstyne has analyzed different approaches to
understanding those boundaries, particularly categories of
speech that are either included or excluded from First
Amendment protection. 34 In his review he identifies several
frameworks that include a sliding scale of protection for
various categories of speech. Political speech is usually under
the "most protected" category, while criminal speech occupies
the " least protected" zone. In between lie categories such as
35
"private," "social," "aesthetic" and "scientific" speech. The
fact that political speech garners the most protection is not hard
to explain - for many the key to the value of the free speech
36
guarantee is its contribution to American democracy.
Gossip is not explicitly addressed in Van Alstyne's analysis.
Nevertheless gossip may be encompassed by the "social" or
"private" categories. As government regulation rarely reaches
the social/private, the issue is not one that draws a lot of case
law or commentary. Nevertheless it is worth noting that in the
Van Alstyne scheme, gossip might be deserving of a relatively
high degree of protection. 37 If gossip can be shown to
inform/instigate the exposure of corruption in government, then
it would appear to veer toward political speech, requiring the
most protection. The question of gossip's place in the strata of
protected categories remains open, depending in large part on
the words and their context.
At the level of the Supreme Court, litigation dealing with the
free speech rights of public employees came to the fore in the
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1950's and 1960's. 38 In Pickering v. Board ofEducation
( 1968) the court set new standards regarding the free speech
39
rights of public employees. Pickering was a school teacher
who had written to a newspaper criticizing the school board
and the superintendent. He was subsequently fired. On appeal
the Supreme Court held that his free speech rights had been
violated: "... absent proof of false statements knowingly or
recklessly made by Pickering, a teacher's exercise of his right
to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the
basis for his dismissal from public employment. "40

Pickering was predicated on a balancing of interests: "The
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."41
Subsequent decisions about the firing of public employees
have come out of the Pickering mold. Over the course of thirty
years the Court has considered a string of cases involving the
firing of teachers, a nurse, two assistant district attorneys, and a
42
The Court has had the opportunity to
deputy constable.
explain the criteria that establish " matters of public concern"
(Connick and Rankin),43 the burdens on both sides (Doyle and
Rankin),44 speech conducted specifically in pursuance of job
45
duties (Garcetti), and the role of the courts in relation to the
"facts" that might justify a termination ( Waters). 46

Garcetti, the most recent Supreme Court decision to address
the issue of public employee free speech, has generated a
significant debate about the reach of the First Amendment. 47 In
Garcetti the Court held that employee speech made pursuant to
official duties receives no First Amendment protection. A
government employer is free to "exercise ... employer control
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. . d or created. 1148
over what the employer itself has commtssiOne
As gossip of any kind, and more particularly the
is never commissioned by an employer, the Garcettz ruhng IS
too narrow to address the problems created by gossip.
In Waters v Churchill, the word "gossip" is never used to
describe a conversation between two nurses on a break at work.
The employer's allegation was, however, that part of the
conversation concerned negative comments about the
plaintiffs supervisor who was out of earshot at the time. The
Court found that the reason for the plaintiffs dismissal was
unclear and therefore it was unable to determine if the speech
49
for which she was terminated was protected speech.
Nevertheless, Waters reveals the Court, in a plurality opinion,
leaning heavily toward deference to the employer's
of harm in the workplace. Sachs' review of th1s opm10n
summarizes the key points:

Although some speech may not be disruptive
and may possibly be of value, the plurality
noted that the Court has consistently declined
any questioning of decisions made by
government employers on matters regarding
employee speech.
All this notwithstanding, the plurality stated that
the First Amendment should not necessarily be
absent from all government employer decisions.
... [I]t is often the government employee who
knows best the possible problems that plague
the particular agency for whom he or she works.
Where this is the case, the employee may have a
strong interest in airing his or her views on
public matters. In such a situation the employer
would have to make a "substantial showing that
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the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive
before it may be punished."
.... [T]he plurality concluded that employer
decision-making would not have an onerous
burden placed on it by having courts "look to
the facts as the employer reasonably found them
to be."
.... Even if [the employee's] speech addressed a
matter of public concern, the potential
disruptiveness of the speech as reported "was
enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment
value it might have had." 50
While the Court's doctrine has shifted/evolved over time,
the focal point remains some "issue of public concern." In all
but one of these cases the government employees expressed
concern over particular policies and/or individuals in
management; there is a bona fide belief that errors have been
made that are detrimental to the workplace. The nurse
complained about a policy that she believed threatened patient
care (the exact nature of her complaints remained in dispute
throughout the litigation); the assistant district attorney
inquired (via an office survey) about transfer policies and
political pressure on prosecutors; the college professor publicly
disagreed with the Board of Regents over school policy; and
the school teacher disputed the Board of Education's fiscal
policy decisions. At first glance there is little in these examples
that overlaps with our conception of gossip. However the gap
between complaints about office policy and gossip about
employer behavior will in some cases, like Hooksett, be very
hard to discern.
For the Supreme Court, two criteria are paramount: a) if the
speaker, as a citizen, addressed a matter of public concern, and
b) whether the employee's interest in expressing gossip
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outweighs any injury the speech could cause to the
government's interest, as employer, in promoting the efficiency
51
of the public services it performs through its employees.
Fired-for-gossip cases are rare in the federal courts. Waters
might be an exception to that rule, but even in Waters the
relevance of gossip to the employer's action is disputed. A
recent attempt to equate a ban on workplace gossip to prior
restraint failed in the District Court. When a public school
employee was fired for gossip, the court found as a matter_ of
law that, " ... a prohibition against 'gossip' cannot support a Ftrst
·
·
· .. " 52 In sta te courts ,
Amendment pnor
restramt
c 1atm.
employees in disputes involving gossip also have been
unsuccessful. Courts in Rhode Island and Ohio have ruled in
favor of government employers on a variety of grounds in two
53
cases where gossip was an element of the dispute. It should
be noted that in neither case did the employees invoke free
speech rights.
One can readily imagine circumstances where the First
Amendment claim is central in a public employment dispute.
Returning to the Hooksett Four dispute described supra, we see
a well-balanced clash between gossiping public employees and
town officials. In a public statement on the Hooksett
4
Four, the Town Council noted that the town "suffered from a
lack of management continuity for at least four years" with six
different individuals in the Town Administrator's office over a
four-year period. It further noted that some of these
administrators cited "serious personnel problems." In addition,
the statement noted that the incidents of gossip were sparked
when a woman who was one of the subjects of the gossip
worked extra hours in the short-staffed Finance Department.
Had the Hooksett Four raised a federal free speech claim
they would have encountered the issues that have dominated in
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federal cases since Pickering:
a) did the employee speak as a citizen on a matter of
public concern?
b) did the employee's interest in the expression of gossip
outweigh any injury the speech could cause to the
government's interest, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs?
The first question should be answered in the affirmative. As
the gossip concerned the public employees' legitimate interest
in a situation where another employee may have been
improperly promoted (or compensated), the reason for the
gossip involves a nascent issue of public interest involving
possible corruption, misuse of public funds, conflict of interest
and violation of ethics laws. This is all the more important
given the history of "serious personnel problems" in the office.
The second part of the test, requiring a balancing of
interests, is more difficult to gauge. Is the interest of the
Hooksett Four in discussing this issue valuable enough to
justify any injury the speech could cause to the town's
promotion of the efficiency of the public services it p erforms
through its employees? From the Town Council point of view,
the gossip was entirely false and very damaging.
"[T]he issue was not one of idle gossip, but a
conscious and concerted effort to damage
reputations, to spread untrue stories with the
knowledge that they were not true and evidently
to retaliate for some perceived preferential
treatment. The rumors, were they believed
credible, could have been cause for removal of
the Administrator and could have formed the
basis for a sexual harassment suit against the
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town. Furthermore, the rumors were also
intended to create tumult in the ranks; evident
from a phone call that was placed to the home of
,ss
. 11
the employee who was out on med1ca eave.
From this perspective the injury is grave and the effort to
"create tumult" in the workplace hinders the efficiency of
public service. Is that injury sufficient to outweigh the interest
of the gossipers in airing the allegation?
Given that, in most employment situations, neither side is
certain of the truth at the time the gossip is communicated, the
balancing of interests becomes extremely context-sensitive. In
predicting how courts will read that balance of interests, the
Waters decision reveals a distinct preference for valuing the
employer's interest.
The Court held in Waters, that
" ... employer decisionmaking will not be unduly burdened by
having courts look to the facts as the employer reasonably
found them to be." 56 [emphasis added]
The Court, in Waters, did not consider the role of gossip as
a means of fact-finding in the workplace. Refuting the
common belief that gossip leads to unreliable information,
Ayim defends gossip as a mode of inquiry with similar
57
Hafen
standards of fact-finding as those applied in science.
finds that "to gossip is to both contest and wield power,
authority, and discipline." 58 Indeed, gossip may be the only
means for some individuals who have little power in the formal
59
.
d
. fl
organization structure to obtam an assert m uence.
The following hypothetical situation will serve to illustrate
how seemingly "trivial" gossip could deserve the protection of
the First Amendment. Imagine that in January 2008 employees
in the office of New York Governor Elliot Spitzer have begun
to discuss the possibility that he has a mistress. Some
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employees are aware of questions that are being raised by his
advisors about mysterious accounts and expenditures. The
gossip includes references to a woman visiting the Governor's
hotel room during an out of town trip. None of the employees
are aware of any ongoing criminal investigation. Learning
about this gossip, the Governor's chief of staff fires an
employee who had admitted to spreading the rumor. Several
months after the firing, the Governor resigns in disgrace when
the press reveals his relationship with a prostitute. 60
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to say that the
employees were exercising free speech rights in a manner that
was admittedly detrimental to the career of one governor, but it
was also in fact to the benefit of the state and the office of the
governor. In hindsight we know that the employees were on to
something close to the truth. The difficulty is that, at the time
of circulating the gossip, the employees had no way to tell how
true the allegations were. No doubt there is a lot of gossip in
most places of employment, gossip that circulates with no
factual basis, and some of it has negative consequences for the
integrity or the efficiency of providing public service. It is in
that context that supervisors, such as the chief of staff, have to
make a decision about the impact of gossip in the workplace.
CONCLUSION
Gossip is a difficult case. On one hand it relates easily to
traditional understandings of the purpose of the free speech
guarantee. Free speech fosters democracy and gossip is a
democratic form of speech. In some contexts, gossip is an
embryonic representation of issues that will come to fruition as
corruption allegations or sexual discrimination/harassment
allegations. Hence, the connection to "matters of public
concern," governance, and politics matters. Free speech also
fosters discovery of the truth - and the role of gossip in relation

to whistle-blowing activities is doubtless substantial. Finally,
free speech is critical to self-realization. Gossip serves a key
function in our networks (in and out of the workplace) and
helps define our personalities and our values. On the other
hand the destructive impact of gossip is recognized time and
'
.
again by courts as giving rise to a significant employer mterest.
The application of the Pickering test adds another
of
difficulty. Rutherglen refers to the "uncertainty inherent m the
l_eave
balancing test" and concludes that "[t]oo few
public employees as second-class citizens and the pubhc Itself
uninformed about how the government actually operates. Too
many rights risk paralyzing the operation of government
as dissenting employees claim their right to speak out agamst
.
. l ement. "6t Th ere IS,
policies that they have a duty to Imp
however, a way to protect more employee speech under curr_ent
doctrine. The courts should begin to demand more specific
evidence of the harm done by employee speech. Mere
reference to "promoting efficiency" is no match for
demonstrating a diminishment of service to the public. That
approach would put more bite in the Pickering test and serve to
foster the First Amendment rights of employees.
In light of the most recent Supreme Court decisions, v:e see
significant skepticism in the courts about the protectiOn
employee speech in general and gossip in particular, more
the case of public employment. The inevitability of gossip m
complex organizations has not deterred the courts in giving
leeway to employers who wish to punish it.

Stephen Breyer, audio interview with Nina Totenberg for All Things
Considered, National Public Radio, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/

1
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INTRODUCTION
The economic crisis that emerged in late 2007 continues to
occupy an important place in many political and non-political
discussions and can be traced to a number of players. The role
many financial institutions, mortgage brokers, appraisers, and
speculators played is well documented. Individual borrowers
also contributed to this sub-prime lending crisis either
knowingly or unwittingly through participation in the fraud
committed by other parties. Several experts have put the blame
squarely on the politicians who promoted home-ownership as
the ultimate measure of success in American society and the
government agencies (e.g. Fannie Mae) that were charged with
assisting in the process of making these home ownership
dreams come true.
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